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Abstract 
Ethiopia’s Constitution provides for a parallel –federal and state– court system. 
While federal courts entertain cases of federal matter, state courts adjudicate 
regional matters. However, there are ambiguous issues and practical limitations 
relating to this judicial power decentralization, some of which have an undesirable 
implication on the self-governance of regional states. These are the federal versus 
state matter controversy, the scope of the Federal Judicial Administration Council’s 
involvement in the nomination of state court judges, lack of standard criteria to 
calculate the cost regional state courts incur in exercising delegated judicial powers 
and the issue of cassation over cassation on state matters. Several challenges arise 
from the distribution of judicial authority in Ethiopia. First, regional states have 
done little with regard to distinguishing state matters from federal matters, and 
claiming reimbursement for costs they incur in exercising delegated federal judicial 
power. Second, the federal Supreme Court allocates nominal compensatory budget 
without considering the number of federal cases that are adjudicated in state courts 
and accordingly computing the cost incurred while state courts exercise delegated 
federal judicial power. Third, cassation over cassation on state matters seems to be 
inconsistent with the federal arrangement. These factors indicate gaps in the 
decentralization of judicial power which necessitate constitutional and legislative 
measures that can rectify these limitations commensurate with the power of 
regional states to exercise judicial power in regional matters.   
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The FDRE Constitution provides for the establishment of an independent 
judicial system both at federal and state levels, which is “one of the fundamental 
institutions of any democratic constitutional system”.1 This shows that the 
Ethiopian judicial system is designed with parallel court systems in which 
regional states and the federal government have their own set of independent 
court structures and administrations.2 Division of adjudicative responsibility is a 
fundamental component of Ethiopia’s federal system. The Constitution 
establishes tiers of federal and state courts, and gives an overview of their 
jurisdiction leaving the details to be determined through legislation.3 These 
courts have specified jurisdiction in different subject matters and apply laws in 
their judicial competence.4  
Federal courts are authorized to see cases of federal matters while state 
courts are entitled to handle regional matters. However, it is not adequately clear 
as to what constitutes a federal, and which matters are reserved to state courts.5 
There are also many problematic constitutional issues arising out of distribution 
of judicial authority in Ethiopia’s federal system. One could point out the role of 
the Federal Judicial Administration Council (FJAC) in forwarding its opinion on 
the nomination of regional court judges, the legal bases for ‘empowerment’ of 
regional first instance courts to handle federal matters (for instance in criminal 
and labour issues), and cases that can be adjudicated by regional courts through 
delegation. Other issues include whether the concept of residual power applies 
to justify the competence of regional first instance courts to adjudicate federal 
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Acronyms: 
FJAC Federal Judicial Administration Council 
HoF House of Federation 
HoPR House of Peoples' Representatives 
JAC Judicial Administrative Council 
NNP Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
SNNP Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
1 Semahagn Gashu (2014), The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation: Ethnicity, 
Ideology and Democracy in Ethiopia, Ashgate Publishing Limited, USA, P. 218. 
2 Assefa Fiseha (2011), ‘Separation of powers and its implications for the judiciary in 
Ethiopia’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, p .704. 
3 See, the FDRE Constitution, Article 78(2)&(3).  
4 For this reason, there is no judicial hierarchy between the federal and regional states courts. 
5 Assefa Fiseha (2011), supra note 2, p. 704. 
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matters, and the constitutional base in demanding federal attorney license to 
represent a case (that involves federal matters) adjudicated in regional courts.  
There is a clear constitutional provision that requires the federal government 
to reimburse costs incurred by regional state courts in the course of handling 
federal cases. However, there are no objective standards and transparent criteria 
in determining compensatory budget. This article explores the modes and extent 
of decentralization of judicial power in Ethiopia. It also examines the 
constitutional provisions and practical limitations relating to decentralization of 
judicial power, and their implications on the self-governance of regional states. 
The first section of the article deals with the discourse on federal and state 
matters and how this can be identified and determined. The second section 
discusses allocation of compensatory budget for states whose regional supreme 
and high courts exercise delegated federal judicial power. It examines how 
compensatory budget is computed. Section 3 deals with the role of the Federal 
Judicial Administration Council in the appointment process of regional state 
court judges. It also explains the potential reason for such kind of arrangement.  
Sections 4 and 5 deal with the debate in the choice of working language in 
regional state courts while they exercise delegated power, attorney license in 
federal matters, and cassation over cassation on state matters. 
1. Federal versus State Matters: Scope and Meaning      
1.1 Options in the distribution of judicial authority under federalism 
Federal political systems have tiers of government with powers allocated among 
them.6 Given the importance of distribution of power in a federal system, there 
is a need to define the jurisdiction (power) of the two tiers of government. These 
may include division of functions and governmental structures between levels of 
government, and this should be mirrored in the legislature, executive and 
judiciary. However, there is an argument that prompts a question “whether the 
division of power inherent in federalism applies for judicial power to the extent 
of requiring each order of government to have its own court system”.7   
In this regard, federations vary in the distribution of judicial authority and in 
setting the structure of courts that reflect the federal character of a polity. These 
variations range from federations whose constitutions allocate judicial power 
between the federal government and states to those federations whose 
constitutions subject state courts to the federal Supreme Court review. Some 
                                           
6 Ronald L. Watts (2008) Comparing Federal Systems, (3rd ed.), McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, Montreal & Kingston, P. 9. 
7 Assefa Fiseha (2006), Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: A 
Comparative Study, Wolf Legal Publishers, Oisterwijk, p. 415 
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federations (such as Germany, Switzerland and India) perceive lower federal 
courts “as unnecessary, expensive and likely an intrusion on the autonomy of 
the state governments”.8 According to this view, state courts are believed to be 
competent for the work required so long as appeal is guaranteed to a higher 
federal court.9  
On the other hand, federations such as United States and Ethiopia divide 
judicial authority between the federal government and the states, (each with 
their own independent court structures and administrations), corresponding to 
legislative and executive functions. According to this approach, there should be 
dual set of courts that apply and interpret laws of the respective tiers of 
government.10 Under this system “[t]ogether with a subnational executive, there 
should be a subnational legislature that, within the capacities granted in the 
national constitution, makes the laws that affect the subnational territory” in 
addition to which there must be “a judiciary that enforces the laws enacted by 
the subnational legislature”.11 In this kind of federation, unless provided 
otherwise, laws enacted by each level of government will be interpreted by its 
own judicial organ.  
1.2 Overview of federal and regional state mandates in adjudication  
In many federations, the judicial system is recognized as dual court system. The 
distribution of powers in federal arrangements enables federal governments and 
regional states to pass laws on matters that fall within the ambit of their 
constitutional mandate.12 Federal courts and State courts are also expected to 
apply and interpret laws, which are enacted by their respective levels of 
legislative bodies 
Ethiopia’s Constitution recognizes federal and regional state courts13 and 
allocates judicial powers to each level of courts.14 The allocation of powers is 
made on the basis of subject-matter jurisdiction. Federal courts adjudicate issues 
of national concern, while state courts are best suited to handle regional 
matters.15 The allocation of judicial powers avoids the overlapping of 
jurisdictions. In the absence of such allocation, “[s]tate and federal judiciaries 
                                           
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Maxwell A. Cameron & Tulia G. Falleti (2005), ‘Federalism and the Subnational 
Separation of Powers’, Publius, pp. 245-271, p. 246 
12 Nigussie Afesha (2016), ‘The Practice of Informal Changes to the Ethiopian Constitution 
in the Course of Application’, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 391. 
13 Id., Articles 78(1) and 79(1)  
14 Id.,, Article 80   
15 See, Proclamation No. 25/1996, Federal Courts Proclamation, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 2nd 
Year No. 13, Addis Ababa, 15 February 1996, Articles 3 and 4. 
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not only resolve disputes but, with their overlapping jurisdictions, themselves 
engage in intersystem power struggles”.16 Thus federal courts in Ethiopia 
adjudicate federal matters while regional state courts adjudicate regional matters 
in their own independent court structures and administrations.17 In addition to 
state matters, regional state courts handle federal matters through delegation by 
applying federal laws.18 However, what constitutes a federal or state matter is 
often contested.19 This raises the question as to how federal matters can be 
distinguished from state matters. The other question relates to whether a certain 
matter could possibly be a federal and state matter simultaneously.  
To address these issues, one may focus on the constitutional provisions that 
deal with division of power. One can essentially categorise a certain matter into 
federal or state matter based on Articles 51, 52 and 55 of the Constitution. The 
logical extension of this view is that federal matters are those matters that are 
governed under federal laws enacted by federal legislative organ, HoPR. And, 
state matters are issues, which are adjudicated based on laws enacted by the 
State Council. This relates to the fact that federal and state courts should apply 
and interpret federal and state laws in their respective levels of courts. However, 
the statement also needs further consideration because a question can arise 
whether enactment of a given legislation by a certain level of government (for 
instance by HoPR) automatically makes the matter federal. The answer depends 
on the nature of the case and the exclusivity of the power given to that level of 
government.   
It is important to note that, owing to the way the constitutional power 
distribution is transcribed, there are matters which are difficult to mechanically 
dichotomize into federal and state matters. The constitutional provisions that 
deal with division of power perhaps might not fully answer issues relating to the 
federal or state matter taxonomy. Upon careful scrutiny of the Constitution, 
there are several matters, which seem to fall under the category of federal 
matters even though they are potentially termed as state matters. The mere 
inclusion of a certain matter in Articles 51 or 55 of the FRDE Constitution does 
not thus invariably render it federal matter. Such claim may have negative 
repercussion on the scope of constitutional powers of the regions.  
 
                                           
16 John W. Winkle III (1974), ‘Dimensions of Judicial Federalism’, Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 416, No 1, p. 68. 
17 See, the FDRE Constitution, Article 80.  
18 It should be noted that space of delegation of federal courts jurisdiction to the regional 
state courts is restricted to state High courts. The constitution does not contain a structural 
and recognized place for regional first instance courts on delegated power.   
19 Assefa Fiseha (2011), supra note 2, p 704. 
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1.3 Adjudication in land (resource) utilization, contracts and taxation 
The mandate to enact specific laws on the utilization of land and other natural 
resources is given to the HoPR.20 On the other hand, regional states are 
constitutionally authorized to administer land and other natural resources in 
accordance with federal laws.21 A question arises whether the law that governs 
utilization of land and other natural resources is a federal matter or a state 
matter. If certain cases (that involve disputes on utilization of land and other 
natural resources) appear in regional state courts, an issue can arise whether 
state courts would handle the case as state matter or through delegation. The 
Constitution allows regional states to execute federal laws on land and other 
natural resources in the course of which regional state courts apply federal land 
laws including other natural resource laws. Under such settings, their 
competence cannot be considered as delegated jurisdiction. Thus, it can be 
argued that the mere enactment of certain legislation by the HoPR does not 
make an issue a federal matter so long as the application and interpretation of 
such laws are constitutionally granted to regional states.   
There are also several laws, which are difficult to categorise either as laws 
enacted by federal government or state council, or whether the power is a 
federal or state matter through reference to the Constitution. One can mention 
laws which were enacted during the Imperial period, and that are being applied 
in federal and state courts. Examples in this regard are laws that govern persons, 
property, contract, succession, tort and others for which it is difficult to cite 
clear constitutional provision that determines whether these issues are federal or 
regional state matters. This evokes the question whether regional courts are 
empowered to see contract disputes as regional matter.  
In this regard, Mehari argues that contract law falls within the jurisdiction of 
the regional state, and cases that involve contract issues are adjudicated by the 
State Courts.22 Yet, there are questions that remain unanswered as to whether 
adjudication of contracts falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the states (as a 
constitutional mandate) or as a residual power of the state, which is left 
undefined. The federal government has been working to come up with draft 
laws in some of these matters including property and contract laws.23 It is to be 
noted that there are many issues in contractual disputes that may have regional 
and national dimensions.  
                                           
20 FDRE Constitution, Article 55(2)(a). 
21 Id., Art. 52(2)(d).  
22 Mehari Redae (2015), ‘Cassation over Cassation and its Challenges in Ethiopia’, Mizan 
Law Review, Vol. 9, No.1, p. 175.   
23 The office of Federal Attorney General has released its engagement in preparing draft 
laws on person, property, contract and succession law.   
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There are also matters which are not allocated exclusively either to the centre 
or the regional state.24 In this regard, one can mention laws, which have direct 
and indirect relation with social, economic and development matters. There are 
issues that concurrently constitute federal and regional matters. The essential 
provision to be cited in this regard is Article 98 of the Constitution that gives the 
federal government and states the legislative and executive power over 
concurrent taxation. However, the federal government has been empowered 
exclusively to legislate and execute laws with respect to concurrent power of 
taxation while the regional states are entitled for their share.25  
If tax dispute on issues that fall under the concurrent power of taxation 
appears in a regional state court, a question can arise whether the court 
entertains the case as delegated power or shared power. The Constitution seems 
to have envisaged that federal and regional states shall execute their respective 
tax laws that are enacted based on their concurrent power of taxation. This 
shows that regional state courts can have jurisdiction relating to laws enacted on 
the basis of the concurrent taxation regime, and they can assume delegated 
jurisdiction to adjudicate tax disputes that involve federal tax laws.   
1.4 Matters under federal jurisdiction 
There are matters that the Constitution gives exclusively to the federal 
government; but, in practice (and upon the permission of the HoPR via a 
proclamation), the laws are applied in the first instance courts of regional states. 
In this regard, legislative and executive power over penal and labour laws is 
given to the federal government under Article 55(5)&(6) of the Constitution.  
The Constitution allows delegation of the power to exercise Federal High 
Court and First Instance Court jurisdiction to regional state Supreme Courts and 
High Courts respectively. It does not extend such delegation to First Instance 
Courts of regional states (to see and solve cases that involve federal matters). 
There seems to be variation relating to labour law and criminal cases. The 
Labour Proclamation gives the mandate to see and decide –certain federal 
cases– to First Instance Courts of regional states. Accordingly, First Instance 
Courts of regional states can have delegated jurisdiction to settle and determine 
selected labour cases such as disciplinary measures including dismissal, claim 
related to termination of employment contract, remuneration, leave and 
                                           
24 Assefa Fiseha (2006), ‘The Theory versus Practice in the Implementation of Ethiopia’s 
Ethnic Federalism’, in the Devid Turton (ed.), Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian 
Experience in Comparative Perspective,  Ohio and Addis Ababa  University Press, p. 141 
25 Nigussie Afesha, supra note 12, pp.368-369 
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employment injury.26 The Proclamation assigns similar jurisdiction to the 
federal and State First Instance Courts. The authorization of federal and state 
First Instance Courts to review and decide similar labour cases is inconsistent 
with the Constitution which states that delegation of power to exercise federal 
First Instance Court jurisdiction is given to High Courts of regional states.  
The other related issue that needs to be seen is the power of the HoPR to 
enact specific laws concerning the penal code. It is the HoPR that has the power 
to enact specific laws concerning the penal code.27 The States may, however, 
enact penal law on matters that are not specifically covered by federal penal 
law.28 This shows that since the penal code is enacted by the HoPR, the power to 
apply and interpret the existing penal code is the exclusive power of federal 
judicial organs. The supreme and high courts of regional states may apply and 
interpret the penal code because the supreme and high courts of regional states 
are vested with the power to exercise Federal High Court and First-Instance 
Courts jurisdiction respectively.29  
Unlike labour law, the current Criminal Code does not give power to First 
Instance Courts of regional states to interpret and apply the federal criminal 
code. One may inquire into the legal grounds as to how regional first instance 
courts get the power to handle criminal matters, and the interests that are being 
promoted by allowing regional first instance courts to adjudicate criminal 
matters. Proclamation No. 25/1996 does not authorize first instance courts of 
regional states to entertain federal matters.30 As the Proclamation merely lists 
the civil and criminal cases that shall be adjudicated by federal courts, this 
implies that state courts can see (in their delegation capacity only) those civil 
and criminal matters that are listed in the Proclamation.  
One can argue that civil and criminal cases which are not listed as federal 
matters in the Proclamation fall within the ambit of regional state courts, and 
                                           
26 See, Proclamation No.1156/2019, Labour Proclamation. Art 139(1) reads as follows: “The 
labour division of a Federal and Regional First Instance Court shall have jurisdiction to 
settle and determine the following and other similar individual labour dispute(a) 
disciplinary measures including dismissal (b) claims related to the termination of 
employment contracts (c) claims related to hours of work, remuneration, leaves and rest 
day (d) claims related to the issuance of certificate of service and clearance (e) claims 
pertaining to employment injury, transfer, promotion, training and other similar issues; (f) 
Unless otherwise provided in this Proclamation, suits pertaining to violations of 
provisions of this Proclamation.” 
27 FDRE Constitution, Article 55(5).  
28 Id., Article 55(5).  
29 Id., Art 80(2) &(4). 
30 See, Proclamation No. 25/1996, Federal Courts Proclamation, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 2nd 
Year No. 13, Addis Ababa, 15 February 1996, Article 3.  
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they have to be adjudicated by state courts.31 According to Abebe, for example, 
civil and criminal cases which are not specifically reserved for federal courts are 
considered as a ‘residual power’ of state courts.32 The question is whether such 
allocation of ‘residual power’ is in tandem with the Constitution.  In spite of 
such counter arguments, we can observe that the Proclamation has not 
exhaustively enumerated the jurisdiction of federal courts, and it has left the rest 
to be adjudicated as residual judicial power of the regional state courts. 
In the SNNP regional state, for example, Wereda courts have civil and 
criminal jurisdiction over matters that fall under the Awraja and Wereda courts 
pursuant to the civil and criminal codes and other laws.33 These powers of the 
Wereda courts have been amended through Proclamation No 130/2009 which is 
enacted to redefine the powers of the regional state courts.34 Pursuant to this 
Proclamation, Wereda courts have jurisdiction over cases involving an amount 
up to three thousand (3,000) Ethiopian Birr; or cases whose value cannot be 
expressed in money; and cases appealed from social courts.35  
The new Proclamation does not state whether Wereda courts will continue 
assuming their material jurisdiction over criminal matters. This triggers the 
question whether the Proclamation revokes the criminal jurisdiction of Wereda 
courts. The answer should be in the negative because social courts have material 
jurisdiction over limited criminal matters36 over which Wereda courts shall have 
appellate jurisdiction.37  
Although wereda courts have no constitutional base to entertain criminal 
cases, they have been handling civil and criminal cases that fall within their 
ambit and not listed in the Proclamation as federal civil and criminal matters (to 
                                           
31 For instance, Yoseph Aemro supported this view at ‘Training of Trainers’ which was held 
from October 7-10, 2013, organized by Addis Ababa University Center for Human 
Rights.  
32 Abebe Mulatu, (2001), ‘The Court System and Questions of Jurisdiction under the FDRE 
Constitution and Proclamation 25/26’ in Proceedings of the Symposium on the Role of 
Courts in the Enforcement of the Constitution (Addis Ababa: Birhanena Selam, p.130. 
33 See Proclamation 43/2002, Revised Courts Proclamation of the Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples Regional State, Debub Negarit Gazeta, 7th Year No 10, Awassa, 
20 April, 2002, Article 7.  
34 See, Proclamation No 130/2009, Re-revised Courts Proclamation No 130 /2009 of the 
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional States, Debub Negarit Gazeta, 8th  
Year No 4, Hawassa, Nov.10/2009, Article 4. 
35 Ibid   
36 See, Proclamation  No. 18/1998, Proclamation for the Establishment of Kebele Social 
Courts of the SNNP Regional State, Debub Negarit Gazeta, 3rd Year No. 3, Hawassa, 14th  
March, 1998, Article 19(1).   
37 See, Proclamation No 130/2009, Article 4. 
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be adjudicated by federal courts). The silence of Federal Supreme Court 
Cassation Bench and/or regional supreme courts seems to be associated with the 
inaccessibility of regional high courts to see criminal matters at Wereda level.  
It should be noted that the discourse on federal and state matters is important 
because it allows regional states to spend their time and regional resources in 
those matters over which they have constitutional mandate. It should also be 
noted that regional state courts are entitled to get compensatory budget when 
they adjudicate federal matters.  
2. Provision of Compensatory Budget for Exercising Delegated 
Federal Jurisdiction by State courts 
As stated earlier, federal and regional governments have jurisdiction over 
federal and regional state matters respectively. In the course of these functions, 
the federal government is given the authority to establish Federal High and 
First-Instance Courts in different parts of the country. Nevertheless, until these 
courts are established at regional state levels, state Supreme and High courts 
shall (in addition to matters under their exclusive mandate), exercise the 
jurisdictions of federal High Court and First-Instance Court respectively.38  
The Constitution states that the budget of Supreme and High Courts of a 
regional state shall be determined by the respective State Council.39 Article 79(7) 
of the FDRE Constitution further provides that the “House of Peoples’ 
Representatives shall allocate compensatory budget for States, whose Supreme 
and High courts concurrently exercise the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court 
and Federal First Instance Courts.” This is in tandem with the constitutional 
provision which requires government at federal and regional state levels to bear 
the financial cost necessary to carry out all responsibilities and functions 
assigned to them by law.  
Unless otherwise agreed upon, the federal government shall bear the 
financial expenditures required for the carrying out of Federal High Court and of 
the First-Instance Courts jurisdiction in the state courts.40 Hence, the federal 
government shall defray the costs incurred by courts of regional states, and the 
regional state should not draw up budget for activities which are not 
constitutionally assigned to them. If regional states continue financing the 
budget to carry out delegated power form their own source of revenue, they will 
face budget constraints thereby becoming financially dependent on grants which 
will be given to them from the central government.  
                                           
38 See, the FDRE Constitution, Article 78(2).  
39 Id., Article 79(7).  
40 See, Id., Article, 94(1). 
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An issue may arise whether courts of regional states are entitled to get 
compensatory budget where the federal government establishes federal high and 
first instance courts in the regions. As Gedion and Abduletif noted, the exercise 
of Federal High and First-Instance Courts jurisdictions in regional States 
Supreme and High courts should be seen as temporary arrangement.41 This is 
because the Constitution gives the HoPR the option to establish Federal High 
and First-instance courts nationwide or in some parts of the country.42 The 
establishment of Federal High and First-Instance Courts in the regional states 
puts an end to the delegation of judicial powers to state courts43 upon which the 
regional judiciaries are deemed lacking technical competence over federal 
matters.44  
Federal High Courts are established in Afar, Benshangul, Gambella, Somali 
and SNNP regional states, and in effect, supreme courts of these five regional 
states supreme courts lack technical competence to exercise Federal High Court 
judicial jurisdictions given to state courts through delegation.45 Yet, the Federal 
Supreme Court Cassation Division has, in one of its decisions, rendered binding 
interpretation regarding the effects of establishing Federal High Court in the five 
regional states in relation to their delegated powers.46 According to this decision, 
the establishment of Federal High Court in the five regional states only revokes 
the power of the Supreme Courts of regional states to exercise the first instance 
jurisdiction of the federal High Court though delegation. The Federal Cassation 
decision shows that the establishment of Federal High Court in the five regional 
states does not altogether take away the power of the regional Supreme courts to 
see federal cases referred from the state High courts through appeal.47 Supreme 
courts will thus continue exercising the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal 
High Court, which is an aspect of delegated judicial jurisdiction, as this fact is 
taken into consideration in the allocation of compensatory budgets.48  
                                           
41 Gedion T. Hessebon and Abduletif k. Idris (2017), ‘The Supreme Court of Ethiopia: 
Federalism’s Bystander’, in Nicholas Aroney and John Kincaid (eds.) Courts in Federal 
Countries: Federalists or Unitarists? p. 178. 
42 See, the Amhara Regional State Constitution, Article 78 (2). 
43 Gedion T. Hessebon and Abduletif K. Idris, supra note 41, p. 178p 
44 Ibid. 
45 See Proclamation No. 322/2003, the Federal High Court Establishment Proclamation, Art 
2. 
46 See, the decision of the Federal cassation Division on a case between Ethiopia Insurance 
Company versus Ato Solomon Yakob,  rendered on  Nov. 11, 2020,  File number, 54577, 
Volume 12, pp. 457-450 
47 Ibid. 
48 Some even argue that the state courts that adjudicate federal matters collect court fees 
from civil cases and financial penalties from criminal cases, and this has been taken into 
374                            MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 13, No. 3                               December 2019 
 
 
Following the constitutional obligation of HoPR to allocate compensatory 
budgets to reimburse the cost states incur in the course of exercising Federal 
High Court and Federal First-Instance Courts jurisdictions, state constitutions 
empower different organs to claim compensatory budgets. In this regard, the 
Amhara Regional State Constitution empowers the president of the Supreme 
Court49 whereas SNNP regional state gives this mandate to the state Supreme 
Court.50 The Oromia Regional State Constitution states that expenses incurred 
by Oromia regional state courts while exercising delegated federal jurisdictions, 
shall be borne by the federal government.51 With regard to the assessment of the 
compensatory budget, Solomon argues that “[u]nder the delegation schemes, the 
federal government should reimburse the share of each state based on the actual 
costs incurred in performing the delegated function”.52 From this perspective, 
the reimbursement is not grant per se, and can be assessed based on the number 
of cases (which involve federal matters) that are entertained by regional courts.  
There was failure to pay compensatory budget “to reimburse the cost 
incurred by states” in spite of “an explicit constitutional requirement” 53 until the 
recent practice of the Federal Supreme Court to compensate regional states 
whose supreme and high courts exercise federal judicial jurisdiction.54 However, 
there is no directive issued by the Federal Supreme Court that regulates the 
determination and allocation of compensatory budget payable to states courts.55 
The table below shows the amount of annual compensatory budget that the 
Federal Supreme Court provides for the nine states supreme courts since 2018.     
 
 
                                                                                                            
consideration as a compromise for the nominal compensatory budget allocated to the state 
courts while exercising delegated Federal matters. The author is the opinion that the 
suggestion is legitimate but it should be seen in line with Art 94(1) of the FDRE 
Constitution that states unless otherwise agreed upon, the financial expenditures required 
for the carrying out of any delegated function by a State shall be borne by the delegating 
party. This preposition seems to give the impression that court fees and financial penalties 
are taken into consideration from the outset.  
49 Amhara Regional State Constitution, Article 68 (7). 
50 SNNP regional state constitution, Article 75 (7). 
51 Oromia Regional State Constitution, Article 63(6). 
52 Solomon Negussie (2008), Fiscal Federalism in the Ethiopian Ethnic-based Federal 
System, Rev. ed. Netherlands Wolf legal publishers, p. 236.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Interview with Ato Goshiye Damitew, Court Manager,  Federal Supreme Court, October 
3, 2019, Addis Ababa 
55 Interview with Ato Boja Tadesse, Head of Office of the Federal Supreme Court President, 
October 3, 2019, Addis Ababa. 
 








State Supreme court 
Budget 
requested 
by the state 
Supreme 
courts 
Budget allocated to the nine state 
Supreme courts 
2018 2019 2020 
1 Tigray Supreme court 1, 446,500.00 394,722.00 394,722.00 638,720.00 
2 Oromia Supreme court 8,418,555.00 394,722.00 394,722.00 638,720.00 
3 Amhara Supreme court Not requested  394,722.00 394,722.00 638,720.00 
4 SNNP Supreme court 1,365,000.00 394,722.00 394,722.00 638,720.00 
5 Gambella Supreme court Not requested  284,222.00 284,222.00 484,224.00 
6 Afar Supreme court Not requested  284,222.00 284,222.00 484,224.00 
7 Benishangul Gumuz 
Supreme court 
Not requested  284,222.00 284,222.00 484,224.00 
8 Hariri Supreme court Not requested  284,222.00 284,222.00 484,224.00 
9 Somalia Supreme court 3,422,079. 58 284,222.00 284,222.00 484,224.00 
 Source, Federal Supreme Court Finance Directorate   
As the table above indicates, the nine supreme courts of regional states are 
placed under two categories. The four supreme courts (Amhara, Oromia, SNNP 
and Tigray State Supreme Courts), are clustered into one category, with 
identical compensatory budget allocation irrespective of the number of federal 
cases adjudicated in the courts of the regional states.  On the other hand, the 
Supreme Courts of Gambela, Afar, Benishangul/Gumuz, Hariri, Somali regional 
states are grouped into another category, and granted identical compensatory 
budget. Moreover, even though Federal High Courts are established in the Afar, 
Benshangul Gumuz, Gambella, Somali and SNNP regional states, the 
compensatory budget does not take this factor into account.  
The Federal Supreme Court provides compensatory budget for the supreme 
courts of nine regional states without taking into consideration claims of 
compensatory budget from supreme courts of regional states or analyzing the 
number of federal cases seen in the nine states Supreme and High courts.56 This 
problem is expected to be addressed upon the enactment of the Federal Courts 
Draft Proclamation which requires the preparation and submission of reports 
along with supporting data regarding federal cases seen in the Supreme and 
High courts of regional states.57 The Draft Proclamation also empowers the 
President of the Federal Supreme Court to decide on the compensatory budget 
request of the state courts relating to their exercise of federal judicial power by 
delegation.58  
                                           
56 Interview with W/ro Emebet W/Geworgis, Federal Supreme Court, Finance  Directorate, 
Director, October 3, 2019, Addis Ababa 
57 Draft Federal Court Proclamation, Art 17(1)(e), on file with author. 
58 See, the Draft Federal Court Proclamation, Art 17(1)(f). 
376                            MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 13, No. 3                               December 2019 
 
 
Apportioning compensatory budget among Supreme Courts of regional states 
without valid standards and assessment seems to have been based on the 
assumption that courts of regional states handle federal cases as their ‘ordinary 
judicial function’.59 This seems to have mainly emanated from the wrong 
association of compensatory budget with the general grant transfers from the 
federal government to regional states.  
 It is to be noted that the Constitution reserves limited financial resources to 
regional states that undertake activities based on their constitutional mandate, 
and the reluctance of the federal government to provide compensatory budget 
may further expose regional states to financial constraints. This challenge can 
indeed impair the competence of regional states to provide necessary public 
services for residents of the region using the revenue collected from regional 
community. This in return increases the regional state’s dependence on national 
transfers, in the form of conditional grant, to deliver basic social services and 
regional administration of justice over state matters, thereby adversely affecting 
state autonomy.  
3.  FJAC Role on the Appointment of Regional State Court 
Judges vs. Regional State Self-autonomy 
The idea of decentralization of judicial power not only empowers the federal 
government and states to define the organization, hierarchy and administration 
of courts in their respective territory, it also gives authority to both tiers of 
government the power to decide how to recruit, appoint and promote judges to 
their respective courts. It also includes the power to decide which institution 
/organ/ undertakes the recruitment, appointment, promotion and transfer of 
judges in their respective courts. The capacity of regional states to make 
recruitment, appointment, promotion and transfer of judges for state courts is an 
integral part of their self-governance.  
The Judicial Administrative Council (JAC) is a responsible organ for the 
recruitment, appointment, promotion and transfer of judges.60 By virtue of the 
Constitution, judicial administrative council is established at federal and state 
levels. Although the Constitution seems to tacitly limit the establishment of JAC 
at Federal and State levels, JAC has also been established at municipal level.61 
                                           
59 Interview with Ato Mate Megene, President of Hawassa of City High Court, Hawassa, 15 
April, 2018. 
60 See, the FDRE Constitution, Article 79(4) 
61 Assefa Fiseha (2010), ‘The Concept of Separation of Powers and Its Implication on the 
Role of the Judiciary in Ethiopia’, in the Assefa Fiseha and Getachew Assefa (eds.) 
Institutionalizing Constitutionalism and the Role of the Law:  Towards a Constitutional 
Practice in Ethiopia, Ethiopia Constitutional Law Series, Vol. 3, p. 35. 
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One may question the constitutional base of establishing JAC at municipal level. 
Yet, some of the regional state constitutions envisage JAC at municipal level. 
For instance, the SNNP Regional State Constitution has declared the 
establishment JAC at zone and special wereda levels.62 This is also replicated in 
the SNNP Regional State Judicial Administration Commission Establishment 
Proclamation.63 
The Constitution states that the president and vice-president of the regional 
Supreme Courts are appointed by the State Council upon the recommendation of 
the Chief Executive of the State.64 One may also expect the same trend in the 
appointment of Supreme, High and First Instance courts judges of regional 
states. The appointment of judges for regional state courts is approved by the 
state’s Judicial Administration Council. However, the Constitution requires the 
State Judicial Administration Council, in the course of selection, to solicit and 
obtain the views of the Federal Judicial Administrative Council (FJAC) before 
submitting the names of nominees to the State Council. The FJAC Establishment 
Proclamation states that one of the main duties of the FJAC is to forward its 
opinion on the list of regional Supreme and High Court candidate judges, 
submitted to it by regional judicial administration councils.65 In this regard, state 
courts have been soliciting the opinion of the FJAC on the list of nominees for 
regional Supreme and High Court judgeship.66  
After having obtained the views of the FJAC, the State Judicial 
Administration Council (SJC) sends the list of nominees to the State Council. 
The SNNP regional state JAC, in addition to the opinion of the FJAC, is also 
required to solicit and obtain the views of the Zonal Judicial Administration 
Commission before submitting the nominees to the State Council.67 Since it is 
embodied the FDRE Constitution, the regional states have to adhere to this 
constitutional provision, and the FJAC is also responsible to give its views and 
                                           
62 See, the SNNPR Regional State Constitution, Article 76(3).  
63 See, Proclamation No.12/1997, SNNP Regional State Judicial Administration 
Commission Establishment Proclamation, Debub Negarit Gazetta, 2nd year, No. 2, 
Awassa, 28th February, 1997, Articles 3 and 6. 
64 FDRE Constitution, Article 81(3).  
65 See, Proclamation No. 684/2010, Amended Federal Judicial Administration Council 
Establishment Proclamation, Article 6(e). 
66 Interview with Ato Henok Mamo Guyale, Judicial Administration Support Work Process 
Coordinator at the City High Court, Hawassa, 16 April, 2018 
67 See article 76(3) of the SNNP Regional State Constitution cum. Article 6 of Proclamation 
No.12/1997, SNNPR Regional State Judicial Administration Commission Establishment 
Proclamation, Debub Negarit Gazetta, 2nd year, No.2, Hawassa, 28th February, 1997. 
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recommendations to the regional states.68 It should be noted that the obligation 
of the State Judicial Administration Council to obtain opinion of the FJAC will 
be waived if FJAC does not submit its views within three months thereby 
enabling the State Council to grant the appointments upon the recommendation 
of the state Judicial Administration Council alone.  
One may associate FJAC participation in the selection process of regional 
state Supreme and High courts judges with the authorization of state courts to 
exercise federal judicial jurisdictions.69 This can be justifiably inferred from the 
non-participation of the FJAC in the nomination of judges for regional state first 
instance courts. Since the state Supreme and High courts exercise judicial 
jurisdiction of the federal High and First-Instance courts respectively, the 
federal government wants to check the professional competence of the judges to 
handle delegated federal jurisdiction. However, the scope of FJAC’s power in 
this regard is limited to forwarding opinion on the nomination of judges for the 
Supreme Court and High court of regional states. The ultimate power for 
approval is reserved to the state legislature.70 This implies that the State Council 
has the power to reject the opinion of the FJAC on valid grounds.  
Yet one can argue that the involvement of FJAC on the nomination of state 
courts judges may seem to be inconsistent with the spirit and logic of the federal 
arrangement established in the Constitution. Second, although the final word of 
approval is reserved to the state councils, due to the centralization trend 
observed in Ethiopia’s federal arrangement, it is highly unlike state councils to 
resist the opinion of (position taken by) the FJAC. An equally important point 
that needs to be reflected upon relates to the role of FJAC in the nomination of 
State First-Instance courts judges. It is clear that the state Judicial 
Administration Council has no obligation to solicit and obtain the views of the 
FJAC on candidate judges for State First-Instance courts. As Christophe Van der 
Beken states, regional State Council can appoint state first instance court judges 
only upon the recommendation of a regional state’s Judicial Administration 
Council. Despite this clear constitutional stipulation, however, the Constitutions 
of Oromia and Somali regional states require their respective State Judicial 
Administration Commissions to solicit and obtain the views of the FJAC on the 
nominees of judges to be appointed for State First-Instance courts.71  
                                           
68 Berhanu Gutema Balcha (2009), Constitutionalism in the Horn of Africa: Lesson from the 
New Constitution of Ethiopia, DIIPER & Department of History, International and Social 
Studies Aalborg University, p. 13. 
69 Christophe Van der Beken (2017) Completing the Constitutional Architecture: A 
Comparative Analysis of Sub-National Constitution in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa University 
Press, p.137 
70 Assefa Fiseha, The Concept of Separation of Powers, supra note 61, p. 36. 
71 Christophe Van der Beken, supra note 69, p. 137. 
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As Tsegaye noted, “[i]n a federal polity, because there is dual 
constitutionalism (often reinforced by the existence of at least two constitutional 
texts), the state constitutions are also used to reaffirm, explain, and elaborate on 
state powers that are ‘granted’ or ‘left’ to the states by the Federal 
constitution”.72 Otherwise, such move must be forbidden on the basis of 
protecting the powers (and functions) of the states and to defend its 
constitutionally guaranteed autonomy.   
The process of appointment of a regional state court judge starts from 
vacancy announcement based on which the state Judicial Administration 
Council selects candidates that satisfy the minimum requirements. After having 
examined documents and other procedures, it sends list of nominees for FJAC’s 
opinion to obtain opinion before the list is sent to the State Council for approval. 
Although the draft Federal Judicial Administration Proclamation –which is 
proposed to replace the existing Federal Judicial Administration Proclamation 
Council Establishment Proclamation– has made changes in the criteria for 
nomination of judges and other issues, the proposed amendment could help the 
judiciary to exercise its judicial function free from internal and external 
influences. Yet, the involvement of the FJAC in the appointment of regional 
state court judges undermines the move to build an independent judiciary in the 
states and erodes the rights of the regional states to determine the operation of 
the regional courts by their own in the context of self-government.    
4. Working Language in Delegated Judicial Authority and 
Attorney License in Federal Matters 
Ethiopia houses a plurality of languages 73 and cognizant of this fact, the FDRE 
Constitution gives the NNPs right to develop their language.74 The Constitution 
also allows all regional states to determine by law their respective working 
languages.75 Accordingly, every regional state determines its working language 
                                           
72 Tsegaye Regassa (2009), ‘Sub-national Constitutions in Ethiopia: Towards Entrenching 
Constitutionalism AT State Level’, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 3, No.1, p.35. 
73 Andreas Eshete (2003), Ethnic Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian Politics, First 
National Conference on Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building (Addis Ababa, United 
Printers), p. 144. 
74 Lovise Aalen (2006), ‘Ethnic Federalism and Self-Determination for Nationalities in a 
Semi-Authoritarian State: the Case of Ethiopia’, International Journal on Minority and 
Group Rights, Vol. 13, p. 256. 
75 Assefa Fiseha (2012), ‘Ethiopia's Experiment in Accommodating Diversity: 20 Years’ 
Balance Sheet’, Regional & Federal Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 444. 
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under its regional constitution.76 In some cases, zonal administration councils 
are also allowed to choose their working languages.77 The Constitution permits 
regional states to use their languages for administrative matters.78 This suggests 
that institutions (including the judiciary) of a regional state can use a working 
language different from the federal working language.  
An issue arises whether regional state courts can use their respective working 
languages in exercising constitutionally delegated federal judicial authority or 
whether they are obliged to use the working language of the federal government. 
As Gedion and Abdulatif stated: 
 Although these courts are applying federal law and acting as federal courts 
in exercising a delegated power, they normally do not use the working 
language of the federal government; instead, they use the working language 
of their respective states. This is particularly the case in states and sub-state 
autonomous administrative units that have working languages different from 
the federal working language. The matter is further complicated because 
most of these cases end up before the Federal Supreme Court for appellate or 
cassation review where Amharic is the working language.79  
Another recurrent issue relates to whether attorney license issued in regional 
states can be acceptable to represent federal cases at courts of regional states 
that are adjudicated based on delegated federal judicial authority. For example, 
the proclamation which regulates the licensing and administration of advocates 
and paralegals in the SNNP Regional State, does not allow an advocate to 
provide services in federal cases adjudicated at state courts.80 
One may question the rationale for requiring attorneys at law (who represent 
federal cases) to produce a federal license. It is to be noted that the judges in the 
courts of regional states are appointed by state councils and handle both federal 
and state matters in the same courtrooms. One may, for example, take the 
instance where a high court judge who was adjudicating federal matters in a 
regional state court resigns and provides attorney service. A question thus arises 
whether this former judge of the high court should have federal license to 
represent federal cases in state courts. 
                                           
76 Asnake Kefale (2003), ‘The Politics of Federalism in Ethiopia: Some Reflection’, in Gana 
T. Aaron & Egwu G. Samuel (eds.), Federalism in Africa: Framing the National 
Question, p. 261. 
77 Aalen, Ethnic Federalism and Self-Determination, supra note 74, p. 256. 
78 Nigussie Afesha (2016), ‘The Ethiopian Constitutional Promises to the Nation and 
Nationalities: The Myth and Reality’, Bahir Dar University Journal of Law, Vol. 6, No. 2.  
79 Gedion T. Hessebon and Abduletif K. Idris, supra note 41, p. 181. 
80 A Proclamation to Provide for Licensing and Administration of Advocates and Paralegals 
Practicing at Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State Courts 
(Proclamation No 164/2016). 
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5. Cassation over Cassation  
According to Article 80(1) of the FDRE Constitution, the Federal Supreme 
Court has “the highest and final judicial power over federal matters”.  It also has 
an appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of State Supreme Courts on federal 
matters (Art. 80/6). Article 80(3)(a) of the FDRE Constitution allows the 
Federal Supreme Court to have “a power of cassation over any final court 
decision containing a basic-error of law”.  Likewise, State Supreme Courts have 
“the power of cassation over any final court decision on State matters which 
contains a basis error of law”. 81   
Although State Supreme Courts have the power of cassation over any final 
court decision on State matters, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division 
has been reviewing decisions rendered by Supreme Court Cassation Division of 
regional states, on State matters, if the decision is contested on the ground that it 
contains a basic error of law. Accordingly, the same case may be reviewed twice 
if it is challenged for containing a basic error of law. This causes cassation over 
cassation, i.e., reviewing a decision which was reviewed by the Cassation 
Division of the State Supreme Court for basic error of law. In effect, “[a] 
decision of any court in Ethiopia today can be reviewed by the Cassation 
Division of the Federal Supreme Court if it manifests a prima facie case for 
basic error of law and if it is a final decision and is filed within the time limit”82  
This raises the question whether cassation over cassation violates the spirit 
and logic of regional state autonomy promoted in the FDRE Constitution. 
Muradu explains the opposing views with respect to the power of cassation over 
cassation. The first argument is that the power of cassation over cassation is not 
in congruity with the law if the matter was originally reviewed based on state 
law. And, it (the federal Cassation Division) may rightly review cases decided 
by state supreme and high courts on federal matters delegated to them.  
On the other hand, there are persons who argue that “the practice of the 
division is in conformity with the spirit and the closer reading of the law 
defining its jurisdiction”.83 Muradu, while stating the first position, indicates that 
power of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division to review cases decided 
by state supreme and high courts on federal matters delegated to them 
corresponds with horizontal distribution of power between the centre and the 
regional state. It should be noted that many do not object the cassation power of 
the Federal Supreme Court over cassation decisions of regional supreme courts 
                                           
81 FDRE Constitution, Article 80(3)(b) 
82 Muradu Abdo (2007), ‘Review of Decisions of State Courts over State matters by the 
Federal Supreme Court’, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 1 No.1, p. 60 
83 Id., p.62 
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that involve cases adjudicated based on delegation power.84 However, Mehari 
contests the cassation power of regional state supreme courts if the case involves 
delegated federal power because the Cassation Bench of the State Supreme 
Court cannot render final decision on federal matters. 85  
In this regard, Semahegn notes that “the Federal Supreme Court has the 
power of cassation over any final court decision containing a basic error of law” 
and he states that “[i]t is dubious how the Federal Supreme Court has such 
power of cassation without any appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of 
regional courts.”86 Gedion and Abduletif argue that setting cassation over 
cassation on decisions of regional state courts (on state matters) is very 
problematic and seems to run counter to the spirit and logic of the federal 
arrangement established in the Constitution.87  
One may thus question the cassation power of the Federal Supreme Court to 
review fundamental error of law over cases that do not involve federal matters. 
The federal government apparently defends the legislation as valid exercise of 
national authority, while regional state courts have done little to claim and 
maintain their supreme judicial authority over state matters. Regional states can, 
for example, take the matter to HoF and seek constitutional interpretation. A key 
factor that has inhibited regional states to confront such challenges (that infringe 
state autonomy) can be the reactions of the federal government through the 
vanguard political party system rather than addressing issues along with the 
federalism axis. This is directly linked with the existence of a dominant party 
system.  
6. Concluding Remarks  
Federal political systems have tiers of legislative, executive and judicial bodies. 
However, variation exists among federations in the distribution of judicial 
authority and the structure of courts. The FDRE Constitution has established 
federal and state courts, each with its own independent court structures and 
administrations. The Constitution also states the jurisdiction of federal and state 
courts. Hence, federal courts are authorized to see cases of federal matters while 
state courts are entitled to handle regional matters. However, there are problems 
                                           
84 Id., p. 64  
85 Mehari Redae (2015), ‘Cassation over Cassation and its Challenges in Ethiopia’, Mizan 
Law Review, Vol. 9, No.1, p 175.   
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መሠረት የክልሉ ሰበር ሰሚ ችሎት በክልል ሕግ እንጂ በፌዴራል ሕግ ላይ የመጨረሻ ትርጉም መስጠት አይቻለውም፡፡” 
86 Semahagn  Gashu , supra note 1, p. 196 
87 Gedion T. Hessebon and Abduletif K. Idris, supra note 41, p. 181 
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relating to the clarity as to what constitutes federal matters and which matters 
are reserved to state courts.  
One can generally use Articles 51, 52 or 55 of the Constitution to categorize 
subject matters into federal and state matters. However, there are matters (such 
as contract, tort and persons) that are difficult to categorize into federal or state 
matters by using Articles 51, 52 or 55 of the Constitution. The discourse on 
federal and state matters is important to determine the amount of compensatory 
budget that regional state courts would receive from the Federal Supreme Court 
in exercising delegated federal powers. The Federal Supreme Court pays 
nominal compensatory budget to the state Supreme Courts without considering 
the number of federal cases seen in these courts.  
The other concern that is examined in this article relates to the cassation over 
cassation power of Federal Supreme Court (even in cases that involve state 
matters).  Although the FDRE Constitution states that the Federal and State 
Supreme courts have the highest and final judicial power over federal matters 
and state matter respectively, the Federal Supreme Court has continued to 
review the cassation decisions of state Supreme Courts (on state matters) by 
citing the literal reading of Article 80(3)(a) of the FDRE Constitution  which 
states that it has a power of cassation over any final court decision containing a 
basic error of law.   
This needs constitutional interpretation by the House of Federation because 
reasonable interpretation based on the objectives and spirit of the Constitution 
(which ensures regional state autonomy) does not envisage the involvement of 
the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court in cases that are state 
matters. The other option for regional states (other than taking the matter to the 
HoF for valid interpretation) is to initiate constitutional amendment that can 
rectify the ambiguity.                                                                              ■ 
